Özet
Introductıon
Greater equality in productivity and income across Europe has been one of the central goals of the European Union since the early days of integration. In achieving this goal, various policy measures have been introduced over the years. Structural funds are the most favorite instrument used by the European Union to reach this goal.
In 1993, the leaders of the Union made a historical decision that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe were allowed to become European Union members if they so wished. According to this decision, twelve new member countries joined the Union in the recent past. No doubt that, this enlargement increases regional disparities within the Union. The new member countries are relatively less wealthy and have a GDP per capita that is less than the European Union average. In addition, all these countries face a wide range of internal regional problems and are economically and socially behind the former members. In short, enlargement of the Union made regional policy much more important than ever before.
Another point which should be taken into account is that, the European Union that the accession countries are joining is very different from the European Community that the catching up countries joined in the 1970's and the 1980's. As the internal market and economic integration are much deeper now than they were before, membership is also likely to increase economic links more than it did earlier 1 .
Structural funds are the most powerful policy tool used by the European Union to combat with the regional disparities within the Union. European str ııctural support has grown in parallel with European Integration. Today, these funds cover nearly one third of the total European Union budget.
To what extent the Structural Funds have succeeded in their objective of reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions? Do they help the Member States in achieving greater economic and social cohesion and in reducing the gap between the centre and the periphery of the European Union? Although Structural Funds cover an important share of the Union budget, these Funds Ville Kaitila, Convergence of Real GDP per capita in the EU 15, ENEPRI Working Paper No. 25/ January 2004, p.2.
and Regional Policies have come under increasing crtisizm based on the lack of upward mobility of assisted regions, and the absence of regional convergence'.
There are also some criticism over the criteria used to assess whether or not regions are eligible for funds, and how these funds are then used? Objective one funding, which makes up two thirds of the structural funds, is only available in those European Union regions (NUTS level 2) where GDP per capita is lower than 75% of the European Union average. These criteria do not allow for inter regional disparities, and regions can find that they lose their eligibility for funding despite stili having some very needy areas within them 3 .
The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of Structural Funds and to look for an answer if these Funds help the Member States in achieving greater economic cohesion. In this context, after the exposition of different theories, reasoning behind the Regional Policy, existing regional disparities within the European Union, development of Structural Funds, some empirical studies and improvements of Cohesion countries will be analyzed.
Economic Growth Theories and the Convergence
When one mentions real convergence 4 between countries/regions, it generally means the approximation of the levels of economic welfare accross those countries/regions. Economic welfare of a country is generally proxied by GDP per capita. For that reason the question of real convergence is related to economic growth.
There are conflicting views in the literature regarding the relationship between convergence and economic integration. Two main economic growth theories arriving at opposite conclusions can be cited, the neoclassical growth theories and the endogenous growth theories. The differences in points of view are caused by diverging beliefs in the underlying assumptions on econornic growth.
The neoclassical Solow theory points out the importance of the capital accumulation and technological progress in the process of economic growth of countries 5 . Assuming of constant returns to scale of each input and of diminishing returns to capital, the model states that output per worker can rise if and only if the technological progress takes place. Hence the economy does not grow in the Tong-run without any technological advance. The Solow model predicts absolute convergence in the sense that the growth rates between the poor and rich countries will be equaiized in 2 Andreas Rodriguez-Pose ve Ugo Fratesi, "Between Development and Social Policies: The Impact of European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions", Regional Studies, Vol. 38.1, February, 2004 , p.99. <www.openeurope.org.uk/research/budgetoutcome > (16.05.2007 4 While real convergence means the convergence of income levels, nominal convergence describes the convergence of price levels and institutional convergence implies hannonisation of legislation. 5 Robert M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, V. 70. I, 1956, p.65-94. the long-run. The convergence mechanism occurs because the capital is subject to diminishing return and the marginal productivity of capital is higher in the poor countries than the rich ones.
According to the view that is based on comperative advantages, if the factors of mobility and diffusion of technology are not restricted, improvements in economic convergence among countries/regions occur. Put it differently, by technological improvements and the presence of free trade and market competition, convergence would take place. Thus opening up the country/region would accelerate the convergence process, as capital flows to capital-scarce countries/regions to benef ı t from higher returns. As the theories related to economic integration allege, through trade and international factor mobilities between the member countries, prices, costs and income levels tend to converge. Consequently economic integration would lead to a greater economic development through a convergence process.
Endogenous growth theories developed in the 1980's, on the other hand, emerged as an attempt of understanding the forces behind technological progress which the Solow model leaves it out as unexplained. Asserting that income convergence between rich and poor countries/regions may not be the only possible outcome, they emphasize the research and development efforts in the accumulation of new ideas` (Romer, 1990) and the role of human capital (Lucas, 1988) in the production of goods. Assuming of unbounded accumulation of ideas and human, capital both model generate an unbounded growth in the long-run which all the factors affecting economic growth is explained in the model itself. Lastly, in the same vein as Romer's, some other endogenous growth models emphasize the importance of commercially oriented research and development efforts as the main engine of growth, explaining the permanent technological and income gaps between countries. For that reason economies need surely not to converge and converuence may not occur. Nonetheless there is another group of endogenous growth models which assumes the existence of knowledge spillover effects. If it is considered that imitating is a cheaper way of using a new technology than by innovating, these models imply that convergence through technological diffusion is a possible outcome.
The Concept of cohesion and Regional Policy
The European Union is an integration which has some deep political, economic and social goals. One of the fundamental objectives of the Union is cohesion; the reduction of economic and social disparities between richer and poorer regions within the Union. However, it shoud be noted that cohesion is not an easy notion to define and although there is often a employment, or environmental conditions, and also has to be seen in terms of oppurtunities as well as outcomes s .
The concept of cohesion is not defined in the founding Treaty, but Article 158 of the Treaty makes clear that this concept requires, in particular, the reduction of disparities between the levels of development of various regions. Cohesion was accepted as one of the main objectives of the Union by the Maastricht Treaty. Since the mid 1980's, the structural funds have provided the main instruments for promoting cohesion in the European continent 9 .
Regional Policy has been introduced for a mix of economic ınotives such as utilisation of production factors and congestion costs; social fiıctors 'such as commitment to full employment and welfare considerations; environmental arguments such as over-crowding and pollution in congested areas; and political reasons such as consequences of disparities for voting patterns 10 .
Since the mid 1970s regional policy has existed at the EU community level. The regional policy's main aim is to make redistribution among regions and countries. It is clear that, there is an equity argument for community action in favour of weak economic regions. In addition, in the presence of externalities even efficiency might require interizovernmental grants from the community to member states n . It is believed that, because of externalities, excessive disparities in the level of socioeconomic development between member countries and the regions hit not only poorer ares, but also richer ones. For this reason, cohesion and regional policy is recognized as one of the foundations of European integration in the Treaty of Rome and in other treaties.
The objectives of regional policy are often discussed as a trade-off between aggregate national efficiency, involving a more efficient allocation of regional resources to maxirnize net national benefit; and inter-regional equity, involving a more equal distribution of income, employment or infrastructure over space. Over the long term, European Union Member States tended to introduce regional policies for reasons of equity but have progressively giyen greater priority to efficiency since the mid-1970s t2 .
Regional policy goals are increasingly concerned with optimising the contribution of regional resources to the creation of economic growth by promoting competitiveness and reducing unemployment. This is true for smaller European Union countries where regional differences are comparatively small (Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland), as well as larger Member States which have suffered relatively high, nationwide unemployment for much of the past 20 years and which have extensive areas experiencing deep-seated industrial decline and social problems. However, the equity goals of regional policy stili exist: concern with spatial equality as an objective of regional development remains to some degree in the Nordic countries, France (in part) and in Germany, where the aims of regional policy continue to advocate the reduction of inter regional disparities in relation to income generation and employment opportunities 13 .
Regional Disparities within the European Union
Regional disparities existing between member states constitute the policies towards cohesion implemented in the European Union. Despite the significant achievements of cohesion policy to date, major disparities stili remain across the Union. Begg identifies four main types of regional problems that cause regional disparities and lists them as follows:
peripherality, remoteness or inaccessibilit, -loss of competitiveness, -the consequencess of economic integration.
The first reason behind the regional differences is lack of development. Because of lack of development many regions became deficient in the dynamic sectors of activity that have supported economic advances. In some parts of the Europe, until quite recently, agriculture remained a dominant industry and there was relatively little industrilization. Secondly geographical disadvantages of some countries like peripherality, remoteness or inaccessibility are important for that those kinds of disadvantages are permanent and cannot easily be countered. Being most of the regions that are designated "less-favoured" on the periphery of the EU is a significant reason for support. Thirdly, loss of competitiveness can arise within the member state countries and it can be hard to reverse the cumulative processes that reinforce the initial loss. While regional problems are associated mainly with the contraction of old staple industries like coal-mining, steel-making, textiles and shipbuilding in northern Europe, some regions have adversely been affected by the relative decline of newer manufacturing industries like motor vehicles. Finally consequences of economic integration may also be a reason of regional disparities. Sometimes dismantling of barriers or a reconfıguration of the policy or regulatory frameworks may in themselves precipitate regional problems t4 .
It is important to consider, when trying to evaluate the success of the Structural Funds on reducing regional disparities within the EU, that changes in regional disparities are not, by themselves,, a sufficient test of the effectiveness of EU cohesion policy. This is because regions have been affected in different ways both by large-scale economic changes and by the processes of European integration. The Community's regional policy is not on a comparable scale to these factors. However, trends in regional development can provide a background against which to judge the effectiveness of the Community's regional policy.
Disparities in GDP per head between the 25 Member States are considerable. In 2003, levels of GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parities) range from 41% of the EU average in Latvia to 215% in Luxembourg. Ireland is the second most prosperous country in these terms with GDP 132 % of the EU average. In all new Member States, GDP per head is below 90% of the EU 25 average, while it is less than half of this level in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as Romania and Bulgaria15 .
In 2002, the most recent year for which regional data are available, levels of GDP per head ranged from 189% of the EU-25 average in the 10 most prosperous regions to 36% in the 10 least prosperous ones. Over one quarter of the EU's population in 64 regions have GDP per head below 75% of the average. In the new Member States this concerns 90% of their total population, the exceptions being the regions of Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, Cyprus and Slovenia. In the EU15, this concems only 13% of the population. Among the EU15, the low-income regions are concentrated geographically in southem Greece, Portugal, southem parts of Spain and Italy, as well as in the new Lander in Gemıany 16 .
Average per capita GDP in the EU fell substantially with enlargement to ten relatively poorer new Member States. In certain regions, this has meant GDP per capita rising above 75% of the new EU 25 average, although they remain below 75% of the average for the EU 15 around 3.5 % of EU population live in such regions. A further 4% live in regions which had GDP per head below 75% of the EU 15 average in the 2000-2006 period but which have grown beyond this level even in the absence of the effect of en I argement
The Structural Funds as a Tool of Cohesion Policy
The European Union attempts to reduce these differences between its regions. It does so by funding programmes in regions that lag behind in production per capita, over-rely on industries in decline, or face high unemployment. These programs, in general, intend to enhance infrastructure, restructure industries, or modernise education' 8 . While this practice is known as cohesion policy, the funds used for this aim is called as Structural Funds.
The origins of the European Union structural funds are to be found in the Treaty of Rome. The preamble of the founding treaty set out the commitment of the member states to "ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions".
The European Regional Development Fund was established as an embryonic regional policy with a limited budget. By establishing it, the European Union aimed to redistribute part of the Member States' budget contributions to the poorest regions. It was not intended primarily to promote cohesion but was nonetheless expected to help the Union's poorer regions. Until the first enlargement of in 1973 with Britain, Denmark and Ireland, the regional disparities were not that striking. But especilly Ireland's accession caused some regional imbalance within the Union. Although Ireland was the poorest accession country, the European Regional Funds were not established with the intention to end the regional disparities in Ireland. The Fund was to compensate Britain for its poor return from the Common Agricultural Policy l9 .
Nearly, a decade later, the Single European Act provided the impetus for a more substantive regional policy, introducing the concept of "economic and social cohesion". The Single European Act took the lead from the original clause in the Treaty of Rome, declaring that "in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to a strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular the community shall aim at reducing the disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions, including rural areas" (Art. 158).
The Single European Act was a very important step in this context. This reform was implying the coordination of the three Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF, and EAGGF-Guidance Section) under the principles of territorial and financial concentration, programming, partnership, and additionality. This step implied not just the coordination of all existing funds under the umbrella of Structural Funds and a comprehensive restructuring of the principles that guided their action, but also the doubling in relative terms of the money committed to regional development, from 15 .1 % of the European budget in 1988 to 30 .2% in 1992 20 .
On the other hand, with the inclusion of economic and social cohesion as one of the Union's priorities alongside the single market and economic and monetary union, the Treaty of the European Union took the commitment one step further 21 . In 1992, the European Union decided to the creation of the Cohesion Fund to support the least prosperous Member States in their efforts towards economic convergence for preparation of econo ınic and monetary union. Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal were the poorest Member States who had a gross national product of less than 90%. Together, the Structural and Cohesion Funds represent the Union's regional policy. Commonly known as cohesion policy, it entails the funding of infrastructure and employment projects in lagging regions of the European Union member states.
Some reforms were made regarding Structural Funds by the Union over the years. The strategy of the Union in the reforms of the Structural Funds was to pursue the objectives of a concentration of resources and a simplification of procedures. But above all the reform was needed in order to make room for the new Member States in a framework where the overall budgetary availability will be limited. Agenda 2000, as decided at Berlin, proposes a reform of the Funds, with the basic objective of not exceeding an expenditure limit of 0.46% of EU GDP. The core of the reform is the strict application of conditionality for access to the funds. This will automatically lead to many regions which have formerly received structural funds losing them in the future. As the Community begins to build up trasfers to the new Member States, transfers to the existing Member States will decline 22 . The period 2000-2006 is therefore a transitional one, with a large allocation of transitional fınancial support to regions losing their status as trasfer recipients.
To avoid transfers rising to unmanageable levels, the Union has decided to limit the transfers from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund to 4% of the recipient country's GDP. This limit appears to be on the low side for the new Member States, which as mentioned above might have expected much higher transfers under the old rules of the Funds. Three points are worth noting howeverB : Over the 2000-2006 financial period, the bulk of the Structural Funds was allocated according to three "Objectives" 25 .
-Objective 1 is to help lagging regions catch up with the rest of Europe by providing basic infrastructure and encouraging business activity. Regions with a GDP per capital of less than 75% of the Union average qualify for this type of funding.
-Objective 2 is to help the economic and social restructuring of regions dependent on industries in decline, agriculture, fishery or areas suffering from problems specific to urbanisation. Eligibility for objective 2 funding is complex. In order to qualify industrial regions must have an unemployment rate above the Union average, a higher percentage of jobs in the industrial sector than the Union average, and a decline in industrial employment. For rural or other types of regions, similar sets of requirements apply. In addition, regions must not be eligible for objective 1 support.
-Objective 3 is to modernise education and increase employment. This type of funding is Union wide. Any region may qualify, provided that it does not receive Objective 1 funding.
Instead of just giving money to the member states, the structural funds cofinance policy measures by the member states according to common rules laid down by the European Union authorities. The funding system in the European Union uses the matching grants instead of unconditional grants. It is generally accepted that, especially in supporting regional investements in infrastructure, matching grants are <http://europa.etLintipol/reg/ >, ( 14.02.2007) 25 Ederveen ve Gorter, Does European Cohesion Policy Reduce Regional Disparities?, p.9. very important part of an efficient granting system. A pure system of unconditinal grants in the Union is neither efficient nor the outcorne of political processes. For this reason, in many cases, the Union finances most of the cost of Project but not all of it. For example, the poorer member states receive 85 per cent of the cost from the Cohesion Fund and finance rest of the cost themselves 26 .
During the 2007-2013 fı nancial period, the key priority of the cohesion policy is the promotion of growth and jobs in all EU regions and cities. For this purpose, EUR 308 billion was earmarked from the budget. This is very significant and the greatest investment ever made by the Union through the Structural Funds and the Cohesion instrument. 81.5% of the total amount is allocated to the "Convergence" objective, under which the poorest Member States and regions take place. In the remaining regions, 16% of the Structural Funds is concentrated on supporting innovation, sustainable development, better accessibility and training projects under the "Regional Competitiveness and Employment" objective. The final 2.5% of the Funds supports cross-border, transnational and inter•egional cooperation under the "European Territorial Cooperation" objective.
Effeets of the Structural Funds on Cohesion Countries
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland whose per capita incomes were significantly below the EU average during the 1990s are those referred to as "cohesion countires". In assessing the effect of the cohesion fund on their economy, it is generally looked at the trend of their respective gross domestic product growth rates. The table below shows the evolution of this indicator for each of four countries and the EU average over the 1988-2004 period. If we compare the average growth rates of cohesion countries with the EU average, it is clear that almost all four countries have succeeded in catching up. However, the experience of these countries in this period is very different. In terms of GDP growth, the EU average for the 1988-2004 period is 2.1%. In the same period, the Irish average Gross Domestic Product growth is 6.3 %. Spain and Portugal also began to grow at better than expected rates from the outset of the Cohesion policy. In general, with the exception of Greece, the cohesion countires showed a better performance of growth after their membership. Greece had a very uneven level of performance between 1989 and 1995.
It is generally questioned that if these impressive convergence rates are linked just on the existence of the Cohesion. Policy or to other factors in combination with cohesion.
No doubt that, Ireland, whose income level is now above the EU average, is the most succesful of all cohesion countries. Over the 90s no other EU member has been able to . match its impressive growth performance. Before 1989, she was stuck for decades at a level of GDP per capita that fluctuated between 62 and 66 % of the EU average. The outstanding change took place in 1989 due to a prolific interaction of the r Single Market. It took off immediately in 1989, and after that she never went back. The expectations and opportunities generated by the Single Market were helpful in transforming Ireland from a peripheral country to a well-developed one.
This impressive catch-up process of Ireland is often linked to the Structural Funds. On the other hand, most scholars link Irish success to the capacity to attract foreign direct investment. No doubt that, its strategy to invest in education and life long learning is a primary factor for the success in attracting foreign direct investment. The direct effect of the Structural Funds on the Irish growth rate was estimated to have added nearly 0.5% to the GDP growth rate over the 1990s. This is a relatively modest number when compared to the scale of the Irish growth rate during this time. However, it should be noted that, indirect effects are not included in these estimates. The indirect effects of the Structural Funds are related (i) to the fact the Structural Funds allowed the implementation of infrastructure projects that would not have been implemented otherwise due to flscal constraints, and (ii) it aided investment in education and life-long learning. The indirect effects are related to the fact that good administrative capacities permitted the channelling of Structural Funds into projects that were consistent with national and regional growth strategies.
Beside goss domestic product growth rate, economic improvements can be gauged along many other different dimensions. Employment and unemployment rates are major indicators of general welfare. Table 2 shows data on employment rates between 1992 and 2003. While the employment rate within the European Union is fairly flat, the shift in Ireland has been from 51.2 to 65.4 %, in Spain from 49.0 to 59.7 %, in Greece from 53.7 % to 57.8 %, and in Portugal from 66.6 to 68.1 %. Portugal, which began with an employment rate higher than the EU average, has made the least gains, but it should be noted that this is also the case in many more developed countries. Another important economic and social indicator that has changed greatly since 1988 is unempoyment. Spain and Ireland are the countries which have made good progress in that sense. (Table 3 ) Unemployment rates in Spain and Ireland were close to one-fifth of working population in pre-1988 period. But now, while unemployment rate is close to EU average in Spain, Ireland has an unemployment rate significantly lower than the average. On the contrary, Greece has experienced increases in unemployment from 1998. Unemployment levels peaked in 1999 at 12 % and then have remained at 2.5 percentage points above the EU average. Therefore, it is clear that the social situation in the countries and regions benefiting from Cohesion policy has not deteriorated as a result of market integration and economic growth and on most indicators it has improved significantly since the beginning of the policy 28 . Instead of looking at from country level, when we look at from the regional level the picture is slightly different. There are two factors behind these doubts in that sense. 
Empirical Studies on the Effectiveness of Structural Funds
Several studies have been conducted to analyse the relation between European structural policy and convergence of member states by economists. Some of them are negative on convergence within the European Union, but some of them have positive findings on convergence. There are some conflicting wievs in that sense. In this last part we will review some of these studies and the empirical findings. Barro and Sala-i Martin (1991, 1992) studied income convergence across countries in a neoclassical framework by using the concept of fi convergence30 . In the analysis of convergence, fi and o -convergence concepts are important. The simplest indicator for assessing convergence between countries or regions within an area is to test whether the relative per capita GDP of a country or region has approached the average of the area. The two most popular measures are the ficonvergence and ci -convergence in that sense. >13 -convergence occurs where there is a negative correlation between initial levels of real GDP per capita and its average annual growth rate. This implies that the poor countries grow faster than the richer ones and it is generally tested by regressing the growth in per capita GDP on its initial level for a giyen cross-section of countries. According to this, if a country starts with a lower income per capita compared to the aveage, it can have a higher income relative to other countries after T period. This is called as catching up. After controlling for other variables, if the negative relationship stili holds, in that case conditional fi convergence takes place m . Another widely used convergence concept is Crconvergence. This concept means that the dispertion of real per capita income tends to decline over time 32 . In their analyses Baro and Sala-i Martin measured the >6 -convergence. According to their empirical results, poor countries tend to catch up with rich countries if the poor countries have high human capital per person. In their common study, their empirical results document the existence of convergence in the sense that economies tend to grow faster in per capita terms when they are further below the steady state position 33 .
Another empirical research was done by Boldrin and Canova in 2001. They analysed the impact of the structural policies on the income disparities between countries and region for the period 1980-1996. They found some opposite results of those by Barro and Sala-i Martin. Their result is negative on convergence within the European Union. According to their results, there is no real tendency for the regional per capita income to grow to their central base of attraction. The gap between the upper and the lower part of the distribution did not really change over time. They claim that, "regional and structural policies serve mostly a redistributional purpose, motivated by the nature of the political equilibria upon which the European Union is built. They have little relationship with fostering economic growth. A successful European Union enlargement calls for an immediate and drastic revision of regional economic policies" 34 .
Martin (1999) argues that, regional policies face a trade-off between equity and efficiency at the spatial level. According to him, if the existence of positive localised spillovers and of returns to scale explain the phenomenon of self sustaining agglomeration, then agglomeration must have some positive efficiency effects. He also argues that because infrastructures financed by regional policies have an impact on transaction costs and therefore on the location decision of firms, the Tong term effect of certain regional policies may be unexpected and unwelcome. In this analysis, it is claimed that policies that reduce agglomeration may then also reduce efficiency and growth". 31 Beta convergence covers two types of convergence: absolute and conditional (on a factor or a set of factors in addition to the initial level of per capita GDP); for more information see Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995 In another analyse, building on a standard neoclassical growth framework, Ederveen, Groot and Nahuis (2002) find that European support did not improve the countries'growth performance. However, they reach some evidence that it enhances growth in countries with the "right" institutions 36 .
Crespo-Cuaresma, Dimitz and Grünwald (2001) performed an empirical study to detect if the European Union membership has a convergence-stimulating effect on tong term growth. In this study, European membership is found to have a significant positive and asymmetric effect on tong term economic growth. On the other hand, results of this study show that, relatively less developed countries profit most from access to the broader technological framework supplied by the regional integrated unit r .
Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) According to the evaluation research reported in the Third Cohesion Report, GDP in real terms at 1999 was between 2.2 and 4.7 per cent higher than it would otherwise have been in the four EU-15 Cohesion countries: Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portuga1 41 . The Commission claims that the Structural and Cohesion Funds do not only stimulate demand by increasing income in the regions assisted. By supporting investment in infrastructure and human capital, they also increase their competitiveness and productivity and so help to expand income over the Tong-term.
All these empirical findings on economic convergence within the Union reflect a very different picture depending on whether one looks at the 15 Member States or at the more than 200 administrative regions across the Union. If we look at for the period 1980-2000, there is a tendency of per capita GDP to converge at the Member State level. In this period, initially low income countries grew faster, on average, than high income ones. However, when we look at convergence in terms of within each country, we see that the picture is different. Within each country, GDP levels have tended to diverge across regions, increasing inequalities 42 . In that sense, findings indicate that both "country convergence" and "region divergence" is experienced within the Europe. An important share of the cohesion funds (68% of total funds) are sent to six macro regions: Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, the six eastern German Lander and the Mezzogiorno in Italy. In terms of convergence of these macro regions, their average GDP did converge. This is true both for fi and Cr convergence. These regions displayed annual growth of 3.3% between 1991 and 2000. In that period, rest of the European Union produced annual growth of 1.9%. On the other hand, the Italian Mezzogiorno didn't converge, while Spain, Portugal and Greece grew only slightly faster than the European Union average. Ireland converged very impressively by moving from the bottom group of the poorest four European Union countries to become one of the top four in terms of GDP per capita 43 .
Conclusion
Like today's new member states, all potential new member states in the future will stili be relatively poor at the time of their accession. For this reason, probably all of them will be eligible for structural assistance which in turn increases European Union expenditure signifıcantly. Therefore, the structural funds and the Union's regional policy will continue to be one of the key elements of enlargement.
In the light of above, it is not possible to answer the key question in a certainity of to what extent the structural assistance will improve the competitiveness of peripheral regions in the tong term and whether they will have lasting positive effects after the transfers will have come to the end.
However, most of the empirical results and the economic situation of so ıne of the old member states benefiting from the structural funds show that, the importance of structural funds can not be neglected. This means that channelling an important part of the funds to new and candidate countries in 2007-2013 period will probably contribute to higher economic growth tates in these countries. We can say that the structural funds will be an important helping hand for the new member states if the microeconomic and macroeconomic conditions in these countries are favourable to economic growth. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that, successful use of these funds will require appropriate and efficient institutional framework in the recipient states.
